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ARRIVING AT REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE DESIGN:
THE REPORTERS' TRAVELOGUE
James A. Henderson, Jr.*
Aaron D. Twerski**
Substantialcommentary and controversy have been generated by the
requirement in the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Liability that plaintiffs in most (but not all) cases involving claims
of defective productdesign show that a reasonablealternativedesign
was available and thatfailure to adopt the alternative rendered the
defendant's design not reasonably safe. Henderson and Twerski
explain the originsof that requirement in American products liability case law and show that it is not only the majority position but
also comports with widely shared views regardingthe proper objectives of our liabilitysystem. Although consumer expectations cannot
serve as a workable, stand-alone test for defective design (except in
the importantsubset of design cases involving product malfunctions)
the authors acknowledge the relevance of reasonable consumer
expectations in a sensible risk-utility analysis. The authors close
with a description of the HabushAmendment, included in section 2,
which imposes the reasonable alternative design requirement. The
authors defend its inclusion as principled and necessary, given the
frequency with which courts have referred,in dicta, to thepossibility
that certain product designs present sufficiently low levels of social
utility and high levels of risk that they should not be distributedat
all.

The role of Reporters expounding on their own Restatement
is awkward. The black letter and comments must speak for
themselves. The work product is ultimately that of the American Law Institute (ALI). Once a Restatement has seen the light
of day, it is in the public arena and no longer the Reporters'
personal work product. Others will interpret the words and
themes over the years. The Reporters' views regarding the
meaning and intent of the Restatement are no more authoritative than those of any other reader. We will thus not address
what the Restatement means, but rather describe the process of
how the Restatement arrived at some of the positions it has
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taken. Whether one makes a trip to a given destination by
train, bus, or plane has little relevance to the question of
where, exactly, one ends up. Travelogues, however, may be of
considerable interest to curious cognoscenti. In the following
pages we hope to share with the reader a small part of what for
us has been a personal odyssey. If in the process of telling the
story we answer the project's critics in some measure, so be it.
To respond is not the major thrust of this piece. Rather, this
Article tells the story-nothing more, nothing less.
We did not begin this project uninformed about the law of
products liability. In our separate and co-authored works
written prior to 1992, we have set out our views on many, if not
most, aspects of the subject. Some commentators have noted
that many of our personal views did not find their way into the
Restatement. That is as it should be. At the same time our
views of what the case law says have influenced powerfully the
positions that we have proposed. We are confident that our
reading of the cases is, in substantial measure, both accurate
and nuanced.
Some contend that we have been political brokers. We are
told, often by the same critics, that we have been ideologically
rigid. It is hard to see how we could be both savvy political
brokers and rigid idealogues. We plead not guilty on both
counts of the indictment. We have heard from a multitude of
voices. Arguments have been presented with both passion and
intellectual rigor. When we have been convinced that they are
correct, we have modified our drafts accordingly. If responding
to principled suggestions constitutes being political, we plead
guilty. And if we maintained some positions because we believed them correct and supported by the case law, then we
take pride in such rigidity. As we shall demonstrate, however,
even when core concepts have remained intact the final work
product has become more nuanced and more sensitive, both in
the black letter and the comments.
Before telling our story, we must make one emphatic statement. We believe that the law of products liability requires a
new Restatement, and we believe that the law can be restated.
Some critics take the position that the case law gives voice to
too many different strains to support a Restatement. Concepts
such as risk-utility, consumer expectations, strict liability, negligence, warranty, and misrepresentation have found their way
into the language of the law, leading critics to argue that there
is no real law of products liability-just a set of disjunctive
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ideas from which courts choose to decide cases. We categorically
reject this dispirited, cynical view. Nearly half a century of
products liability litigation and tens of thousands of reported
cases have not left a legacy of chaos. No industrial giant could
survive if such were the case. The major themes come across
loud and clear. They are the heart and soul of the Restatement
(Third)of Torts: Products Liability.

I. LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN

A. Risk-Utility Balancing

The major theme that drives the Restatement test for design
defect is risk-utility balancing. In short order, we shall demonstrate why risk-utility balancing leads inexorably to a
requirement in most instances that the plaintiff show that a
reasonable alternative design is available.1 But first-why did
we insist on a risk-utility test as the medium for determining
defective design? Why did we not say simply that strict liability
governs products that are designed defectively just as it governs
products that contain manufacturing defects?
Under section 2(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect
when it "departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised" in the preparation and marketing of
the product.2 If one seeks to determine whether a product contains a manufacturing defect, comparison between the intended
design and the allegedly defective product unit will reveal
whether the product is defective. On the other hand, in cases
alleging defective design one cannot identify defect by referring
to the manufacturer's own design standards. Those very standards are under attack as being defective. One cannot mouth
the words "strict liability" and hope to convey any message
regarding how one should determine liability. In the context of
product design, the term "strict liability" proves vacuous. To
give any meaning to the liability standard, one must look
outside the manufacturer's own product design to discover an
objective standard with which to determine defectiveness.

1.
See infra Part II.
2.
See RsrAT~mEN (THIRD) OF TORS: PRODUCTS LIABInr § 2(a) (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
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The overwhelming majority of courts have opted for riskutility balancing to determine whether a product is defectively
designed. 3 Many have recognized that the risk-utility test

3.

See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 1993)

(noting that under Kentucky law "the test for whether a product is in a defective
condition and unreasonably dangerous to the user is whether an ordinarily prudent
manufacturer, being fully aware of the risks, would have placed the product on the
market"); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985) (requiring both a reasonable alternative design and that the "utility of the alternative design
outweighed the utility of the design actually used"); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d
608, 611-13 (Ark. 1991) (holding that a risk-utility analysis is necessary in proving that
a product was unavoidably unsafe as a defense to a defective design claim); Armentrout
v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1992) (delivering jury instructions that stated
that a "product is unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in its design if it creates
a risk of harm to persons which is not outweighed by the benefits to be achieved from
such design"); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 867 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(reversing lower court decision on one claim because jury instruction "improperly
directed the jury to consider whether the product 'created a risk of harm which would
not ordinarily have been expected,' rather than whether the risks associated with [the
product] outweighed its benefits" (citation omitted)); Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (concluding that the proper test for defective
design is "whether the design has created a risk of harm which is so probable that an
ordinarily prudent person, acting as a manufacturer, would pursue a different available
design which would substantially lessen the probability of harm"); Warner Fruehauf
Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995) (holding that "the plaintiff must
'show the risks, costs and benefits of the product in question and alternative designs,'
and 'that the magnitude of the danger from the product outweighed the costs of
avoiding the danger'" (quoting Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir.
1987))); Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983)
(opining that the term "unreasonably dangerous" describes more accurately a manufacturer's or supplier's liability by balancing"the likelihood and gravity of potential injury"
versus the product's utility, the availability of "safer products to meet the same need,
the obviousness of the danger, public knowledge and expectation of the danger, the
adequacy of instructions and warnings on safe use, and the ability to eliminate or
minimize the danger without seriously impairing the product or making it unduly
expensive"); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (stating that the
court's review of case law "revealed a general consensus regarding the utilization in
design defect cases of a balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product design
are weighed against the utility or benefit derived from the product"); Wagatsuma v.
Patch, 879 P.2d 572, 583 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that to decide liability of a
manufacturer for defective design, courts balance, inter alia, "the likelihood and gravity
of the potential harm against the burden of precautions which would effectively avoid
the harm"); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42 (Ind. 1990) (requiring a plaintiff
to "demonstrate that a feasible, safer, more practicable design would have afforded
better protection"); Jenkins v. Anchem Prods., Inc., 886 P.2d 869, 889-90 (Kan. 1994),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 80 (1995) (noting that "evidence of a safer alternative design is
useful in a risk-benefit analysis"); Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me.
1992) (determining whether a product is defectively dangerous by balancing "the danger
presented by the product against its utility"); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539
A.2d 701, 706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (finding the risk-utility test "the only appropriate test to be applied in the instant case because it allows 'full consideration of the
relative merits of a product design'" (quoting Edward S. Digges, Jr. & John G.
Billmyre, ProductLiabilityin Maryland: Traditionaland EmergingTheories ofRecovery
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and Defense, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 16 (1986))); Caron v. General Motors Corp., 643
N.E.2d 471, 476 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that jury must engage in a risk-utility
analysis in defective design cases); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich.
1984) (stating that the "overwhelming consensus among courts deciding defective design
cases is in the use of some form of risk-utility analysis, either as an exclusive or
alternative ground of liability"); Holmv. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn.
1982) (rejecting the latent-patent danger rule in design defect cases and substituting
a "reasonable care" balancing test); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248,
254 (Miss. 1993) (noting that a plaintiff may "recover for any injury resulting from" a
product if she can prove that "the utility of the product is outweighed by the danger
that the product creates"); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986)
(finding that a jury must engage in risk-utility balancing in design defect cases);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (stating that when
"weighing utility and desirability against danger, courts should also consider whether
the risk of danger could have been reduced without significant impact on product
effectiveness and manufacturing cost"); Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269, 1270
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (stating that determining "whether a product has been
defectively designed ordinarily involves a 'risk-utility analysis' "); Brooks v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61-62 (N.M. 1995) (requiring juries to make a "risk-benefit
calculation" when deciding defective design claims); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662
N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that the strict products liability idea "requires a
weighing of the product's dangers against its over-all advantages"); Carrel v. Allied
Prods. Corp., No. 9-94-24, 1995 WL 423388, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1995) (noting
that under the statutory risk-utility test a plaintiff must prove "that the product design
is in a defective condition because the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh
the risks inherent in such design"); Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 886 (Okla.
1994) (noting that one element of a design defect claim is whether a product's "benefits
justify its risks"); Hoyt v. Viteck, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that whether "a product is defectively designed . . . is a question . . . for the court to
consider by balancing the product's utility against the magnitude of the risk associated
with its use"); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1978) (noting that
one consideration in design defect cases is when the product's utility outweighs its
dangers); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988) (adopting
a "risk-benefit test" to determine liability of prescription drug manufacturers); Claytor
v. General Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982) (considering "the usefulness
and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added safety, the likelihood and
potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger" when deciding design
defect claims); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that South Carolina courts balance the utility of the risk in the design versus
the risk's magnitude to decide design defect claims); Turner v. General Motors Corp.,
584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979) (holding that in strict liability cases involving design
defects "tihe jury may be instructed in general terms to consider the utility of the
product and the risks involved in its use"); Anderson v. Weslo, Inc., 906 P.2d 336, 340
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the risk-utility test is one way to analyze defective
design claims); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (W.
Va. 1979) (testing allegedly defective products by a risk-utility balancing test).
Some states have enacted statutes requiring risk-utility balancing for design defect
claims. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2104 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that
"the design shall be presumed to be reasonably safe unless, at the time the product left
the control of the manufacturer, a practical and technically feasible alternative design
was available that would have prevented the harm without significantly impairing the
usefulness, desirability, or marketability of the product"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.56 (West 1991) (adopting a risk-utility standard and providing that a product
is designed unreasonably dangerously if, "at the time the product left its manufacturer's
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originates in negligence doctrine.4 Some courts have noted
subtle differences between design-related risk-utility balancing
under negligence as opposed to strict products liability doctrine.5 Those nuances are recognized in the new Restatement.6
The basic test for design defect, however, is grounded in the
same classic risk-utility balancing that courts traditionally have
used in determining negligence.
Some critics urge that the Restatement should give equal
status to a consumer expectations test for design defect liability.7 They argue that this test constitutes a true strict liability

control," a safer, alternative design for the product existed and the "likelihood that the
product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage
outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and
the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product"); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1996) (providing that a product is not defectively
designed if claimant's harm "was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product
which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially
compromising the product's usefulness or desirability"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.75(E) (Anderson 1995) (providing that a product is not defectively designed if a
plaintiffs injury resulted from "an inherent characteristic of the product which is a
generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability"); TEX. CIrv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.005 (West Supp. 1997) (providing that plaintiff must prove the existence of a "safer
alternative design" that "would have prevented or significantly reduced" claimant's risk
of injury "without substantially impairing the product's utility").
4.
See, e.g., Prentis,365 N.W.2d at 184 (opining that the "risk-utility balancing
test is merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus"); Denny,
662 N.E.2d at 735 (explaining that "the risk/utility balancing test is a 'negligenceinspired' approach, since it invites the parties to adduce proof about the manufacturer's
choices and ultimately requires the fact finder to make a judgment about [the manufacturer's] judgment' "(quoting Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence [to Warranty]to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593,
610, 648 (1980))).
5.
Several courts have indicated that strict liability holds the seller to the expert
standard of knowledge available to the relevant manufacturing community at the time
the product was manufactured. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.,
810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991) (stating that in the strict liability context a "manufacturer
is liable if it failed to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific
community at the time it manufactured or distributed the product"); Woodill v. Parke
Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980) (commenting that if"knowledge existed in
the industry of the dangerous propensity of the manufacturer's product" a manufacturer
may be liable for failure to warn adequately of the danger); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Zenobia, 601 A-2d 633, 641 (Md. 1991) (holding that "a manufacturer of a product is
held to the knowledge of an expert in the field").
6.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 1 cmt. a. This distinction makes
irrelevant whether the particular defendant, because of inadequate resources, was
excusably ignorant of a reasonably knowable risk. This view is adopted in the Products
Liability Restatement. See id.
7.
See, e.g., Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement
(Second),Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REV. 411, 420 (1993) (arguing that the
"consumer expectations test for determining a design defect is so much a part of the
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test. The Restatement takes the position that consumer expectations do not, standing alone, determine defectiveness.8 Although they are an important factor in risk-utility balancing,
consumer expectations are too amorphous to operate as an
independent test for design defect.
Critics disagree with our reading of the case law on this
important issue.9 We believe that these critics are wrong. Both
the reported decisions and a predominant number of commentators agree that the majority rule requires design defect cases to
be governed by risk-utility balancing. Courts, in adopting the
risk-utility test for design defect, have said that they are following the strong majority rule." A large body of scholarly commentators have stated that it is and should be the governing
test for liability."
existing products liability law that it must be retained as part of any new restatement"); Joseph W. Little, The Placeof Consumer Expectationsin ProductStrict Liability
Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1193-94 (1994)
(lamenting the elimination of "the concept of strict liability from product design law");
Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 666 (1995) (writing that a "lack of recognition of the
importance of product portrayal and product image leads to a lack of appropriate
emphasis on the expectations that consumers reasonably develop about products").
8.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. f.
9.
See, e.g., Frank J.Vandall, The Restatement (Third)of Torts, ProductsLiability,
Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 167, 173 (1995) (arguing that cases cited
by the Reporters "do not support their proposition that an overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions rely on risk-utility balancing in design-defect cases").
10. See, e.g., Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (conducting
"an exhaustive review of foreign jurisdictions" that "revealed a general consensus
regarding the utilization in design defect cases" of a risk-utility balancing test); Prentis
v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich. 1984) (noting that the "overwhelming
consensus among courts deciding defective design cases is in the use of some form of
risk-utility analysis"); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993)
(commenting that throughout "the country, the test generally employed to determine
liability for product defects is the 'risk-utility' test").
11. The list begins with the late Deans Prosser and Wade. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER
ET AL., HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORS §§ 32, 96, at 149, 644 (4th ed. 1971) (defining the

standad of conduct in negligence as a balancing of "the risk, .. . probability and extent
of the harm, against the value of the interest the actor is seeking to protect, and the
expedience of the course pursued" and writing that in the area of design defect a
manufacturer's liability appears to be "essentially a matter of negligence"); John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973) (listing factors to be balanced in a risk-utility analysis). It includes Professors
David Fischer, W. Page Keeton, David Owen, Gary Schwartz, and Judge Richard
Posner. See David A. Fischer, ProductsLiability-TheMeaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV.
339, 358-59 (1974) (arguing that "courts should consider, in light of the facts of the
particular case, the merits of the policies underlying strict liability and balance [those]
considerations against countervailing factors"); W. Page Keeton, Products LiabilityDesignHazardsand the Meaning ofDefect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293,313 (1979) (proposing
that a product be determined defectively designed "if a reasonable person would
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A brief word about section 402A and the role of the consumer
expectations test: the black letter of section 402A makes no

conclude that the magnitude of the danger... outweighs the utility of the design"); W.
Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S LJ. 30, 39
(1973) ("But if defect is to be a requirement, it is submitted that there is no way to
avoid a risk-benefit analysis in passing upon designs."); William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, A PositiveEconomic Analysis of ProductsLiability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535,
553-54 (1985) (endorsing use of risk-utility analysis in design defect cases); David G.
Owen, Defectiveness Restated:Exploding the "Strict"ProductsLiability Myth, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 743, 754-55 (opining that "negligence is the ideal standard for product
design responsibility" because it is "predicated on the idea that proper decisions involve
selecting the proper balance of expected advantages and disadvantages, of expected
benefits and costs"); David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 239 (1997) (stating that "[c]ourts and commentators

increasingly comprehend that ascertaining design defectiveness in products liability
cases requires some kind of 'risk-utility' balancing"); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword:
UnderstandingProductsLiability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 464 (1979) (commenting that
there "can be little doubt about the correctness of the risk-benefit standard for design
defect"); GaryT. Schwartz, New Products,Old Products,Evolving Law, RetroactiveLaw,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 803 (1983) (noting that "most of the modem design defect cases
rely on a risk-benefit liability standard that seems to be a strong assertion of the
negligence formula set forth in 1947 by Learned Hand in his effort to codify traditional
negligence reasoning" (footnote omitted)). Two academics turned practitioners, writing
while still in academic life--Sheila Birnbaum and Victor Schwartz-supported the riskutility test for design defect and rejected the consumer expectations test. See Birnbaum,
supra note 4, at 649 ("Imposing a negligence standard for design defect liability is in
many cases only to define in a coherent fashion what litigants are in fact arguing and
what jurors are in essence analyzing. .

..

[Ilt is time for courts to adopt .

..

a pure

negligence/risk-utility test in design defect cases."); Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniform
ProductLiabilityAct-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579,586 (1980) (writing that
the Uniform Act has adopted a standard for design defect cases that "balances risk
against utility"); cf 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.23, at 128-30 (2d ed.

Supp. 1995) (describing "The Retreat of the Consumer Expectations Test"); Mary J.
Davis, Design Defect Liability:In Search ofA Standardof Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L.
REV. 1217, 1236-37 (1993) (commenting that the consumer expectations "test has
proved unworkable for a variety of reasons"); Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of
Risk-BenefitAnalysis in Design Defect Litigation,48 VAND. L. REV. 609,625 (1995) ("The
way in which consumer expectations may be relevant to a risk-benefit test is, like the
obvious aspect of dangers, through their impact on the frequency and severity of injury
and, therefore, constitute a relevant second tier concern. . . ."); William Powers, Jr., A
Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 647
(writing that "in most product cases-especially cases not involving manufacturing
defects-consumer expectations do not provide a meaningful test of defect and therefore
do not provide an adequate ground for strict products liability").
Finally, for whatever weight one chooses to give it, in numerous writings prior to our
appointment as Reporters we found risk-utility to be the only viable test for design
defect. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1532-34 (1992);

James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American
ProductsLiability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (1991).
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mention of consumer expectations.1 2 Two comments, however,
do. Comment g, entitled "Defective Condition," provides: "The
rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at
the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him." 3 Comment i, entitled "Unreasonably Dangerous," states:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products cannot
possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only
from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison
to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an
instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is
especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably
dangerous ....Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol
in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter,
contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous. 4
12.

Section 402A provides:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
13.
Id. § 402A cmt. g.
14.
Id. § 402A cmt. i.
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The simple explanation for the drafters' reliance on a consumer
expectations test in section 402A comments g and i is that the
drafters were not addressing design defect litigation. In 1963
the major focus of attention was the overruling of privity and
the imposition of strict liability in manufacturing defect cases.
Other scholars have made this observation," and it is confirmed
by the writings of Dean Prosser published several years after
the promulgation of section 402A. In the fourth edition of his
hornbook Prosser wrote:
The development and recognition of strict liability has
had a natural tendency to reduce the number of actions
founded on negligence ....

There are ...

two particular

areas in which the liability of the manufacturer, even
though it may occasionally be called strict, appears to rest
primarily upon a departure from proper standards of care,
so that the tort is essentially a matter of negligence.
One of these involves the design of the product, which
includes plan, structure, choice of materials, and specifications. There is no doubt whatever that the manufacturer
is under a duty to use reasonable care to design a product
that is reasonably safe for its intended use, and for other
uses which are foreseeably probable. The question turns on
what is reasonable care and what is reasonable safety. The
maker is not required to design the best possible product, or
one as good as others make, or a better product than the
one he has, so long as it is reasonably safe.'"
The drafters did not contemplate strict liability based on a
consumer expectations test for design defects. The consumer
expectations test was used as a test to impose liability only for
manufacturing defects.1 7 In this context, the consumer expectations test is an acceptable test for liability. 8 Section 2(a) adopts

15.
See W Page Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the
Requirementofa Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855,856-57 (1963); Dix W. Noel, Recent Trends
in Manufacturers'Negligence as to Design, Instructionsor Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 43
(1965); George L. Priest, Strict ProductsLiability: The OriginalIntent, 10 CARDoZO L.
REV. 2301, 2308 (1989).
16.
PROSSER ET AL., supra note 11, § 96, at 644-45.
17.
See id. § 99, at 659.
18.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, at § 2(a). Section 2(a) provides that "a
product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing
of the product." Many jurisdictions define liability for manufacturing defects likewise.
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a test used more frequently by courts that defines a manufacturing defect as one that departs from the manufacturer's

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.55 (West 1991) (authorizing liability if the
"product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by
the same manufacturer"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1996) (authorizing liability
if the product "deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or
from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) (authorizing liability if the product
"deviated from the design specifications, formulae, or performance standards of the
manufacturer or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications or formulae"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.74 (Anderson 1991)
(authorizing liability if the product "deviated in a material way from the design
specifications, formula, or performance standards of the manufacturer, or from
otherwise identical units manufactured to the same design specifications, formula, or
performance standards"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(2)(a) (West 1992) (authorizing liability if the "product deviated in some material way from the design specifications
or performance standards of the manufacturer, or deviated in some material way from
otherwise identical units of the same product line"); see also Singleton v. International
Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law and holding
that "[iun manufacturing defect cases, the plaintiff proves that the product is defective
by simply showing that it does not conform to the manufacturer's specifications");
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 (Alaska 1979) (articulating the test
of manufacturing defect as "deviation from the [manufacturer's] norm"); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (defining manufacturing defect as when a
defective product "differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other
ostensible identical units of the same product line"); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d
671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (noting that in a manufacturing defect case "it is assumed that the
design of the product is safe and had the product been manufactured in accordance with
the design it would have been safe for consumer use"); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) (stating that in manufacturing defect litigation, "the
product may be evaluated against the manufacturer's own production standards, as
manifested by that manufacturer's other like products"); Rix v. General Motors Corp.,
723 P.2d 195, 200 (Mont. 1986) ("Under a manufacturing defect theory, the essential
question is whether the product was flawed or defective because it was not constructed
correctly by the manufacturer."); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846
(N.H. 1978) (finding that a "defect is an accidental variation caused by a mistake in the
manufacturing process ... where the product does not 'conform to the great majority
of products manufactured in accordance with that design'" (quoting James A.
Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview of Manufacturers'ConsciousDesignChoices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543 (1973))); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. 1983) (noting that a product may be defective because
of a mistake in the manufacturing process); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545,
552 (N.Y. 1981) (Jasen, Jones, and Meyer, JJ., dissenting) (describing a manufacturing
defect as follows: a "defectively manufactured product is flawed because it is
misconstructed without regard to whether the intended design of the manufacturer was
safe or not"); MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 104(a) (1979) ("In order to determine that
the product was unreasonably unsafe in construction, the trier of fact must find that
... the product deviated in some material way from the manufacturer's design
specifications or performance standards, or from otherwise identical units of the same
product line."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at
695 (5th ed. 1984) (commenting that a manufacturing flaw causes the product to be
more dangerous than it was designed to be).

574

University of Michigan Journalof Law Refonn

[VOL. 30:2&3

intended design. At several points in the comments, the Products Liability Restatement notes that whenever a product fails
because of a manufacturing defect, a consumer's expectations
with regard to product performance are disappointed. 9 It is a
far cry from this limited use of the consumer expectations test
to its imposition in design litigation. In design cases, consumers
have a right to expect reasonably designed products. Ultimately, however, there is no escape from the issue of what is a
reasonable design and that takes us full circle back to riskutility balancing.
The reference to consumer expectations in section 402A
comment i served another function. It allowed the consumer
expectations test to serve as a defense or as a shield against the
imposition of liability. At the time section 402A was drafted the
"patent danger rule" was the governing rule in the country.20
Furthermore, there was-and continues to be-a belief that
common products whose dangers are known to almost all users
should not be subject to products liability under any theory.2
In the tumultuous years that followed the adoption of section
402A, courts flirted with the consumer expectations test as a

19.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmts. a, b; see also id. § 3 cmt. b
(noting that "manufacturing defects cause products to fail to perform their manifestly
intended functions").
20.
Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. 1950), was the leading case
advocating the patent danger rule. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal.
1970), was the first case to reject the patent danger rule. New York disavowed the rule
in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77 (N.Y. 1976). The overwhelming
majority of courts now clearly have rejected it. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note
2, § 2 reporters' note cmt. c, at 92-93 (listing jurisdictions that have rejected the patent
danger rule).
21.
See, e.g., Jones v. White Motor Co., 401 N.E.2d 223, 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978)
(rejecting the patent danger rule but noting that while "there may be cases where as
a matter of law ... there may be no duty because of an obvious peril ... this [defectiveness] generally is a jury issue"); Jackson v. Coming Glass Works, 538 A.2d 666, 669
(R.I. 1988) (noting that the danger of stacking Coming Ware and glass lids in a
pyramid was so obvious that verdict should be directed for defendant).
In a recent case, Judge Robert Keeton found that the obviousness of risks may in
certain circumstances bar an action on duty grounds. See Kearney v. PhilipMorris, Inc.,
916 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1996), an action brought against a cigarette manufacturer
after several people died in a house fire that occurred when an intoxicated resident of
the home dropped a lit cigarette on the couch and fell asleep. Plaintiffs alleged that the
cigarette design was defective because an alternative low ignition propensity design
that would have prevented the fire in question could have been adopted. See id. at 63.
The court found that defendant cigarette manufacturer breached no duty to the
plaintiff. See id. at 69. In his analysis, Judge Keeton acknowledged that Massachusetts
has rejected the patent danger rule and utilizes risk-utility analysis to decide design
defect cases. See id. at 71. The Judge said that Massachusetts courts have in various
contexts "refused to extend the scope of liability of manufacturers to injuries resulting
from common, everyday products whose obvious dangers are known to be associated
with the use of the product." Id. at 73.
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test for liability in design defect litigation.2 2 To attribute its
legitimate parentage to the drafters of section 402A would be
error. As we have seen, the father of section 402A, William
Prosser, did not see it playing that role. Ultimately courts came
to understand that the consumer expectations concept was too
simplistic to work well for complex design defect litigation.23
The judicial retreat from a consumer expectations test in
recent years has been significant. Courts that formerly used the
test either have abandoned it entirely or cut it back so severely
that its applicability is very limited.24 Indeed, its use by several
courts as a defense against liability is disturbing. Plaintiffs, in
some jurisdictions, have been barred from presenting reasonable alternative designs that could have prevented injury on the
ground that, because its risks were obvious, the product met
consumer expectations.2 5 Some have noted that insistence upon
the consumer expectations test as a sword for the imposition of
liability would make it more likely that the test would also be
used as a shield against the imposition of liability.2 6 We do not
view the consumer expectations test as plaintiff-friendly. This
view is shared by practitioners on both sides of the bar.27
22.
The most famous case adopting the test was Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978). For other decisions adopting the test, see Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-85 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v. Straub Clinic &
Hospital, Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353,
361 (Kan. 1982); Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 68 (Neb. 1987);
Woods v. FruehaufTrailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 774 (Okla. 1988).
23.
Cf. sources cited supra notes 3, 12.
24.
See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (limiting
consumer expectations test in design defect cases); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602
S.W.2d 429, 432 (Ky. 1980) (rejecting consumer expectations test in design defect cases);
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 252-53 (Miss. 1993) (rejecting
consumer expectations test and adopting risk-utility test); Holman ex rel. Ray v. BIC
Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that consumer expectations test can
only be applied to "products about which an ordinary consumer would have knowledge").
25.
See, e.g., Todd v. Soci~t6 Bic, S.A , 21 F.3d 1402, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that, under Illinois law, risk-utility test does not apply to a "simple but obviously
dangerous product"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 359 (1994); Kelley ex rel. Kelley v. Rival
Mfg. Co., 704 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (finding a Crock-Pot not "unreasonably dangerous" because risk of being burned by hot food is obvious).
26.
See 1 MADDEN, supra note 11, § 6.23 (Supp. 1995) (noting that one jurisdiction
tests "an 'unreasonably dangerous' product condition' by requiring that "a product be
shown to be dangerous to an extent beyond what would be expected by an ordinary
consumer").
27.
See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers
to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN.
L. REv. 1043, 1088 (1994). Corboy, a plaintiffs' lawyer, opines:
The consumer expectations test will not be missed by many trial practitioners who
found that, with respect to many products, it is difficult for plaintiffs to show that

576

University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform

[VOL. 30:2&3

B. The ProperRole of Consumer Expectations

Having so staunchly defended the role of risk-utility balancing, one might question the subheading of this section.
Indeed we often get the impression that some critics of the
Restatement stopped reading after perusing the black letter of
section 2(b). We would echo the words of the late Harvard
University Professor Austin Scott: "Read on, my dear student.
Read on."
1. Consumer Expectations as a Factorin Risk-Utility-Section 2 comment f of the Restatement provides an exegesis on the
role of consumer expectations. Comment f provides:
Consumerexpectations:generalconsiderations.Under § 2(b),
consumer expectations do not constitute an independent
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.
Courts often use the term "reasonable consumer expectations" as an equivalent of "proof of a reasonable, safer
design alternative," since reasonable consumers have a right
to expect product designs that conform to the reasonableness standard in § 2(b). However, except as stated in
Comment g, consumer expectations, as such, are not
determinative of defectiveness. That concept does not take
into account whether the proposed alternative design could
be implemented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would provide greater overall safety. Nevertheless, consumer expectations about product performance and
the dangers attendant to product use affect how risks are
perceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the
risks of harm, both of which are relevant under § 2(b). See

ordinary consumers entertain any specific expectations at all. Additionally, the
consumer expectations test leads to confusion in a large number of cases, such as

workplace accidents and injuries to bystanders, where the plaintiff who was
injured is not the consumer who purchased the product. Moreover, in the hands
of some courts, the consumer expectations test serves as a vehicle for applying the
open and obvious danger rule, which often allows manufacturers to escape liability
despite the egregious dangers posed by their products. For these very reasons,

many courts have already abandoned the consumer expectations test.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Banks & O'Connor, supra note 7, at 420 (advocating
retention of the consumer expectations test in the Restatement).
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Comment e. Such expectations are often influenced by how
products are portrayed and marketed and can have a significant impact on consumer behavior. Furthermore, products
liability law derives in part from the law of warranty where
consumer expectations have special significance. Thus,
although consumer expectations are not determinative of
whether a product is defectively designed, they constitute
an important factor in determining the necessity for, or the
adequacy of, a proposed alternative design.2"
As the foregoing comment makes clear, consumer expectations are of great importance in any sensible risk-utility balancing. How consumers perceive a product design is an essential
factor in determining the risk level of the design. As that risk
level rises, the product seller is faced with the task of evaluating the adequacy of the design in light of the elevated risk. No
calculus for foreseeability of risk would be worth very much
without taking into account consumer perceptions and expected
patterns of product use.
What happens if, despite a manufacturer's successful accomplishment of a reasonable design, injured consumers still
insist that they expected the product to perform more safely
than it did? Our first response to such a question is to remind
the reader that section 2(c) imposes liability for failure to warn.
The duty to warn attaches most forcefully at the point where a
product encompasses all that can be expected from reasonable
design. Any doubt on this issue should be laid to rest by comment k to section 2, which provides:
Relationship between design and instruction or warning.
Imposing liability for unsafe designs and for inadequate
instructions or warnings both aim at achieving higher levels
of safety in the use and consumption of products. Instructions and warnings accompanying the product are relevant
to the question of defective design and in some cases adequate instructions and warnings will suffice to render the
product nondefective. However, instructions and warnings
may be ineffective because it reasonably can be foreseen
that users of the product cannot be adequately reached, are
likely to be inattentive, or are insufficiently motivated to
follow the instructions or heed the warnings. Thus, when a

28.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. f.
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safer design can reasonably be implemented, adoption of the
safer design is preferable to a warning that leaves a residuum of risk. When an alternative design to avoid risks cannot reasonably be implemented, adequate instructions and
warnings will be sufficient to render the product reasonably
safe.29

What if the product is reasonably designed, and the warnings
and instructions are reasonably adequate? Is it not possible
that a product could nevertheless disappoint actual consumer
expectations? The answer, of course, is that it is possible. No
one suggests, however, that actual consumer expectations be
the test for liability. Such a test would be totally subjective and
unworkable. It is, of course, possible to frame an objective test
that asks whether a product disappointed reasonable consumer
expectations. Reasonable consumers, however, can only expect
products that are reasonably designed and accompanied by
reasonable warnings. No reasonable consumer has a right to
expect a product with a design that would have avoided injury
to her but would have created risks of equal or greater
magnitude to others using the product. There is no way out of
this dilemma. If a product is reasonably designed and is
accompanied by reasonable warnings, the law has accomplished
reasonable safety. That is all that a manufacturer can deliver
and that is all that the law should demand.
2. Consumer Expectations and the Section 3 Inference of Defect-Consumer expectations come into play in a special genre
of products liability cases. Case law in every jurisdiction recognizes that a plaintiff can establish product defect without
identifying the type of defect. 30 This class of cases once flew

29.
Id. § 2 cmt. k (emphasis added).
30.
See, e.g., Henderson v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 93-6391, 1995 WL 39022, at *1
(10th Cir. Feb. 1, 1995) (applying Oklahoma law and commenting that circumstantial
evidence "has always been considered an acceptable... means of proof' in a products
liability case); Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (allowing
plaintiffs "to ask the jury to infer that the accident was caused by some unknown
defect"); Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631,637 (8th Cir. 1972)
(applying Missouri law and holding that fire and crash of aircraft lost at sea did not
require proof of specific defect); Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182, 1185 (3d Cir.
1970) (applying Pennsylvania law and holding that a plaintiff in a strict liability suit
"does not have to establish a particular defect as the proximate cause of the accident");
Sanders v. Quikstak, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that in
certain circumstances "a plaintiff need not prove a specific defect in the product at
issue" and that "a jury may infer that an accident occurred because of a defect when the

plaintiff has proven that the product did not perform as intended and has excluded all
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under the banner of res ipsa loquitur. In products liability
litigation some courts prefer to characterize this kind of case as
involving liability based on "malfunction"3 1 or simply "circumstantial inference of defect."3 2 The Restatement attempts to
capture this theory of liability in section 3. This section provides:

causes of the accident not attributable to the defendant"); Dietz v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744,
747-48 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that "no specific defect need be shown if the evidence,
direct or circumstantial, permits the inference that the accident was caused by a
defect"); Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 612 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ark. 1981) (stating that
"proof of the specific defect is not required when common experience tells us that the
accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect"); Cassisi v. Maytag Co.,
396 So. 2d 1140, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding it "immaterial that the
plaintiffs failed to identify the specific cause of the malfunction since.., the malfunction itself.. . is evidence of the product's defective condition at both the time of the
injury and the time of the sale"); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240,
243 (Haw. 1970) (observing that the "user's testimony on what happened is another
method of proving that the product was defective"); Garrett v. Nobles, 630 P.2d 656, 659
(Idaho 1981) (opining that "a plaintiff need not prove a specific defect in order to carry
his burden of proof); Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 553 P.2d 1306, 1311
(Idaho 1976) (noting that "[a] primafacie case may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence of a malfunction of the product"); Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 271
N.W.2d 777, 783 (Mich. 1978) (allowing plaintiffs' action without requiring proof of the
specific defect in the product); Western Sur. & Cas. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 433
N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[fin a strict products liability
action, a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of a defect");
Landahl v. Chrysler Corp., 534 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (App. Div. 1988) (holding that a
"plaintiff in a products liability action need not establish the precise nature of the defect
in order to make out a prima facie case"); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (noting that under Ohio law a plaintiff
may use circumstantial evidence to show existence of a defect); Anderson v. Chrysler
Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 194 (W. Va. 1991) (ruling that "circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to make a prima facie case in a strict liability action ... so long as the

evidence shows that a malfunction in the product occurred that would not ordinarily
happen in the absence of a defect").
31. See, e.g., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding
that under Pennsylvania law plaintiff need not prove the existence of a specific defect
if plaintiff can show that the product malfunctioned in the absence of abnormal use and
reasonable secondary causes); Marcus v. Anderson/Gore Homes, Inc., 498 So. 2d 1051,
1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that "[w]hen a product malfunctions during
normal operations, a legal inference arises that the product is defective"); Farmer,553
P.2d at 1312 (finding that "[piroof of malfunction is circumstantial evidence of a defect
in a product since a product will not ordinarily malfunction within the reasonable
contemplation of a consumer in the absence of a defect"); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 686 P.2d 925, 928 (Nev. 1984) (holding that "proof of an unexpected, dangerous
malfunction may suffice to establish a prima facie case for the plaintiff of the existence
of a product defect"); Harkins v. Calumet Realty Co., 614 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (explaining that the malfunction theory" 'permits a plaintiff to prove a defect in
a product with evidence of the occurrence of a malfunction and with evidence eliminating abnormal use or reasonable, secondary causes'" (quoting Rogers v. Johnson &
Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751, 754 (Pa. 1989))).
32.
See sources cited supra note 30.
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It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product defect, without proof of the
specific nature of the defect, when:
(a) the incident resulting in the harm was of a kind that
ordinarily would occur only as a result of product defect;
and
(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion
that more probably than not:
(1) the cause of the harm was a product defect
rather than other possible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons; and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or
distribution.3 3
Admittedly, section 3 is applied most often when a product
fails catastrophically because of a manufacturing defect. Typically the product is destroyed in the accident, and the plaintiff
is forced to rely on an inference of defect based on the factors
set forth in section 3. But section 3 is not limited to manufacturing defects alone. Indeed, the black letter permits an inference of defect without specifying the particular defect. Comment
b discusses the applicability of section 3 to design litigation. It
notes that although the rules of the section
most often apply to manufacturing defects, occasionally a
product design causes the product to malfunction in a
manner identical to that which would ordinarily be caused
by a manufacturing defect. Thus, an aircraft may inadvertently be designed in such a way that, while flying within
its intended performance parameters, the wings suddenly
and unexpectedly fall off, causing harm. In theory, of
course, the plaintiff in such a case should be able to show
how other units in the same production line were designed,
leading to a showing of the reasonable alternative design
under § 2(b). As a practical matter, however, when the incident involving the aircraft is one that ordinarily would
occur only as a result of product defect, and evidence supports the conclusion that the cause of the harm was a
product defect existing at time of sale rather than other
causes, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove with
precision whether the failure resulted from a manufacturing

33.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 3.
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defect or from a fatal shortcoming in the design of the
product. Section 3 allows the trier of fact to conclude that,
either because of a manufacturing defect or a design defect,
the inference of defect is warranted. The plaintiff need not
specify the type of defect responsible for the product malfunction.34
Interestingly, section 3 parallels closely the California Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject. In Soule v.
General Motors Corp.," the California court was asked to
reexamine the role of the consumer expectations test in design
defect litigation. In an earlier case, Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co.,36 the court recognized both consumer expectations and riskutility balancing as alternative methods of establishing a design
defect.3 7 In Soule, the court explained that consumer expecta-

tions could not play a role in a design defect case where the
issue of the adequacy of the design was complex. The court said
that "the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in
which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a
conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety
assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion
about the merits of the design."8 In an interesting footnote the
court sets forth the kind of case in which it would allow consumer expectations to be dispositive of the issue of defect. The
court wrote:
For example, the ordinary consumers of modern automobiles may and do expect that such vehicles will be
designed so as not to explode while idling at stoplights,
experience sudden steering or brake failure as they leave
the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-perhour collisions. If the plaintiff in a product liability action
proved that a vehicle's design produced such a result, the
jury could find forthwith that the car failed to perform as
safely as its ordinary consumers would expect, and was
therefore defective.39

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. § 3 cmt. b.
882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
See id. at 455-56.
Soule, 882 P.2d at 308.
Id. at 308 n.3.
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A finding of defect under section 3 would be permissible under
the facts hypothecated by the Soule court.4 ° No violence would
be done by saying that a product which fails under section 3
fails to meet consumer expectations. Courts frequently say that
in cases in which a res ipsa loquitur style inference is established the product failed to meet consumer expectations. 41 The
first element of a section 3 case is that "the incident resulting
in the harm was of a kind that ordinarily would occur only as
a result of product defect."42 In other words, consumers would
not expect the product to cause injury when put to its manifestly intended use. When coupled with the other elements of a
classic res ipsa loquitur case, utilizing consumer expectations
language to express the result is not untoward. The Restatement eschews use of that language in the black letter because
the classic res ipsa loquitur formulation more accurately expresses the basis of liability.

See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 3 cmt. b, illus. 6. Illustration 6
40.
provides this example:
Mary purchased a new automobile. She drove the car 100 miles without
incident. One day she stopped the car at a red light and leaned back to rest until
the light changed. Suddenly the seat back collapsed backward causing Mary to hit
the accelerator and the car to shoot out into oncoming traffic. Mary suffered harm
in the ensuing collision. Mary's expert witness concludes that the seat back
assembly was defective either because the particular bolt was improperly tightened or the bolt holding the seat back was improperly designed to perform its
intended function. The expert cannot determine, however, which possible defect
actually caused the accident. The evidence is sufficient to reach the trier of fact
on the issue of defect under this Section. Mary need not establish whether the
product was defectively manufactured or defectively designed.

Id.
41.
See, e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(noting that "evidence of the nature of an accident itself may, under certain circumstances, give rise to a reasonable inference that the product was defective because the
circumstances of the product's failure may be such as to frustrate the ordinary
consumer's expectations of its continued performance"); Doyle v. White Metal Rolling
& Stamping Corp., 618 N.E.2d 909, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that plaintiff may
create an inference that a product was defective with evidence that "there was no
abnormal use of the product," "no reasonable secondary cause of the injury," and "the
product failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light ofits nature
App.
and intended function"); Tulgetske v. R.D. Werner Co., 408 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ill.
Ct. 1980) (holding that plaintiff can make out strict liability claim by proving that
product failed to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected in light of its intended
function); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651,655 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985) (observing that "the reasonable expectations of a buyer of a motor vehicle
is that the main electrical cable harness of such vehicle will not start a fire").
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 3.
42.
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We note only that when courts utilize consumer expectations
language to justify a classic res ipsa loquitur case they are not
necessarily espousing a test for defect which differs substantially from that set forth in section 3. Let us be clear. We are not
saying that Soule operates in lock step with section 3 of the
Restatement. We do note, however, that a court that previously
championed the consumer expectations test has trimmed its
sails rather substantially in a manner that closely resembles
the Restatement test for defect.'

II. THE REJECTION OF MACRO RIsK-UTLITY BALANCING
AND THE BIRTH OF COMMENT D

Driven to risk-utility balancing as the test for design defect
by the inexorable force of logic and by the overwhelming body
of case law, we confronted one remaining question. Should riskutility balancing be utilized not for the purpose of deciding
whether a product should have been designed more safely, but
rather whether it should have been marketed at all?
In our pre-Reporter lives, we had pondered this question in
a lengthy article and had concluded first that courts had rejected decisively the idea of liability without defect based on
risk-utility balancing and second that such product-category
liability was untenable both theoretically and practically." We
will not rehash those arguments in this Article. Suffice it to say
that, with regard to some products, there was little disagreement within the ALI that these conclusions were sound.
Courts have not been willing to declare such products as
cigarettes 5 and handguns 6 as defectively designed when there
43.
See Soule, 882 P.2d at 308.
44. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products LiabilityFrontier:The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1321, 1331 (1991).
45.
See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (D. Mass.
1990), affd, 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. grantedandjudgment vacated, 505 U.S.
1215 (1992), on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (resolving appellate jurisdiction
issues rather than products liability law); Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F.
Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F.
Supp. 485, 488-89 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
46. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "Florida law will not apply the theories of strict products
liability and negligence to a gun manufacturer who produces and distributes weapons
that perform as intended and designed"); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250,
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was no reasonable alternative available. Although some academic critics support imposing design liability for this genre of
products based on the fact that the products' overall misery
index outweighs the benefits and pleasure that people derive
from them,4 7 there was no groundswell of support in any of the
advisory groups or indeed at the Annual Meeting of the ALI for
product category liability.
Some did argue, however, that courts should be able to
declare products such as egregiously dangerous toys defective

1272-74 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law and stating that no Louisiana court
"has ever applied a general risk/utility analysis to a well-made product that functioned
precisely as it was designed to do"); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773
(D.N.M. 1987) (stating that "this Court believes that New Mexico courts would follow
the overwhelming weight of authority which rejects strict products liability as a theory
for holding handgun manufacturers liable for the criminal misuse of their products"),
affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Hilberg ex rel. Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761
P.2d 236, 240 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (applying statute allowing recovery only upon a
showing of an actual defect in the gun), overruled on other grounds by Casebolt v.
Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477
N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding no liability under either the consumer
expectations test or the risk-utility test); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748
P.2d 661, 663-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (finding no liability under state statute,
negligence or strict liability).
In McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a wrongful
death action on behalf of victims who were killed in Colin Ferguson's highly publicized
murderous shooting spree on the Long Island Railroad was brought against the
manufacturer of the "Black Talon" bullets used by Ferguson. "Black Talon ammunition
incorporates a hollow-point bullet that is designed to expand upon impact exposing
razor-sharp edges at a 90-degree angle to the bullet. The expansion dramatically
increases the wounding power of the bullets." Id. at 368. Plaintiffs argued that the
bullets were designed defectively in that they caused more damage than would have
been caused by an ordinary bullet. See id. at 370. The claim was thus one for enhanced
injury. The heart of plaintiffs' claim of design defect was that Black Talon bullets failed
the risk-utility test, which is the governing test for defect in New York. See id. at 371.
In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated, "Risk/utility analysis
is inappropriate because the risks arise from the function of the product, not any defect
in the product." Id. The court held that the plaintiffs' design arguments are better
addressed to the legislature rather than common law courts. See id.; accord Downs v.
R.T.S. Sec., Inc., 670 So. 2d 434, 437-39 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
47.
See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center
of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1995) (arguing that because "product
category liability has not been universally rejected" by courts, it should not be excluded
from the Restatement (Third)); Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politicsand Products Liability,
59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1103, 1104-05 (1991) (arguing that "a proper analysis of existing law
would lead to a determination that strict liability should apply to handguns, but that,
consciously or unconsciously, courts are misconstruing their own legal doctrines to avoid
that result"); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category
Liability andAlternative FeasibleDesigns in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1429, 1454 (1994) ("Abolition of product category liability by the Restatement (Third)
is neither intellectually justifiable, morally acceptable, or economically sound.").
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even if reasonable alternative designs were not available.4 8
They contended that when a product presents a high degree of
danger and has little or no social utility, the requirement of an
alternative design should be dispensed with as a requisite for
establishing a prima facie case.
As Reporters, we were faced with a dilemma. The problem
emanated from two sources. First, we found almost no authority
directly imposing liability on this theory. A few courts who
generally impose a requirement of reasonable alternative design
do say in dicta (usually in footnotes) that instances might arise
when a product is so dangerous and has so little utility that it
might be defective even without proof of an alternative design.4 9
We looked in vain, however, for cases in which such macro riskutility balancing was actually utilized. Three state courts had
indeed done so;' ° but those cases were subjected to rather swift

48.
Several members of the American Law Institute Council advocated this position
at the December 12, 1996 Council meeting.
49.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978). The
Wilson court said:
As pointed out above, the court's task is to weigh the factors bearing on the utility
and the magnitude of the risk and to determine whether, on balance, the case is
a proper one for submission to the jury. In this case we focus on the practicability
of a safer alternative design and hold that the evidence was insufficient to permit
the trial judge to consider that factor. Our holding should not be interpreted as
a requirement that this factor must in all cases weigh in plaintiffs favor before
the case can be submitted to the jury. There might be cases in which the jury
would be permitted to hold the defendant liable on account of a dangerous design
feature even though no safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence of a
safer practicable alternative). If, for example, the danger was relatively severe and
the product had only limited utility, the court might properly conclude that the
jury could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not have introduced such
a product into the stream of commerce. We hold here only that, given the nature
of the product and of the defects alleged, it was improper to submit the issue of
a defect in the engine design to the jury in the absence of appropriate evidence
that the safer alternative design was practicable.
Id. at 1328 n.5; see also Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 185 n.ll (Colo. 1992)
(en banc) (noting that "evidence of a feasible design alternative is not always necessary," and citing Wilson); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn. 1987)
("Conceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably
dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than be redesigned.");
Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986) ("We do not rule upon the
fact situation where a claim of design defect is made and where no alternative design
is technologically feasible.").
50.
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) (discussing
application of risk-utility balancing test to aboveground swimming pool with vinyl
bottoms). In Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986), the
court concluded that a manufacturer can be held to a strict liability standard for a
product that fails to meet risk-utility norms because the dangers created by its use,
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legislative reversal.5 ' We were reluctant to fashion a black
letter rule on so slender a thread. Second, we confronted a
difficult drafting problem. Assuming that we opted to allow for
the possibility (yet unrealized) that design liability might ensue
in such exceptional cases without proof of an alternative design,
was it possible to draft a black letter rule that would not be so
broad so as to include products such as motorcycles, adult lawn
darts, or water skis. The problem was that once ensconced in
black letter, we would be giving credence to a theory that the
courts, in general, have rejected soundly. On the other hand, we
did not want to reject summarily the possibility that liability

even if unforeseen at the time of manufacture, outweigh its utility. See id. at 114. If a
product does meet risk-utility norms on its own and is only defective because there
exists an alternative design, however, the manufacturer is held to a negligenceforeseeability standard. See id. at 115.
A third state appellate court may have imposed product-category liability on the
theory that the overall danger of the product outweighs its benefits. In Kelley v. R. G.
Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985), the court held that the manufacturers of
"Saturday Night Specials" could be held liable for injuries suffered by innocent third
parties at the hands of criminals. See id. at 1159. Although earlier in the decision the
court rejected product-category liability based on risk-utility balancing, see id. at 1148,
the court's imposition of liability on manufacturers for injuries caused by cheap
handguns appears to condemn them because the overall utility of this genre of handgun
to society is too low to justify their continued marketing. See id. at 1153-54.
51.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.2800.59(A)(1) (West 1991) (overrulingHalphen, 484
So. 2d 110); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 361 (Supp. 1990) (overruling Kelley, 497 A.2d
1143); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-3(a) (West 1987) (overruling O'Brien, 463 A.2d 298).
Several states have passed somewhat narrower legislation that prohibits actions
against firearm manufacturers for injuries resulting from the weapon's inherent danger.
These statutes, however, continue specifically to allow claims based on either defective
manufacture or defective design (i.e., the failure to institute an alternative design). See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(c) (West 1985) (stating that a "cause of action based upon the
improper selection of design alternatives" is not foreclosed); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-501
(1986) (stating that a claim must be based on "actual defect in design or manufacture"
rather than "inherent potential" to cause injury); IDAHO CODE § 6-1410(3) (1990) (stating
that the statute does not affect a "cause of action based upon the improper selection of
design alternatives"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-720(3) (1995) (permitting a "cause of
action based upon the improper selection of design alternatives"); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.131(2) (1991) (stating that the section "does not affect a cause of action based upon
a defect in design or production").
Although state legislatures have nullified judicial adoption of product category
liability, such nullification has limited application in at least one jurisdiction. In Dewey
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990), the court held that the New
Jersey statute changed existing "rules regarding the burden of proof and the imposition
of liability." See id. at 1252. Thus, for cases filed prior to the statute's enactment, a riskutility case theoretically could be established for products such as cigarettes. Because
only six cigarette cases were pending in New Jersey at the time the legislation was
enacted, the decision of the court allowing a risk-utility case to be made out when there
is no alternative design available is only relevant to a handful of cases.
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might be established in some instances based on the unusually
high risk and almost worthlessness of the product.
A solution to this problem was offered by one of our advisers,
a highly respected plaintiffs lawyer, Robert Habush. Because
we were attempting to create an opening for possible future
expansion in a limited manner, why not draft a comment that
explained the idea? A new comment d was drafted and was
introduced at the 1995 Annual Meeting as the Habush Amendment.52 It reads as follows:
d. Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable
design. Several courts have suggested that the designs of
some products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they
have low social utility and high degree of danger, that
liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable
alternative design. In large part the problem is one of how
the range of relevant alternative designs is described. For
example, a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with
sufficient velocity to cause injury to children could be found
to be defectively designed within the rule of § 2(b). Toy guns
that do not produce injury would constitute reasonable
alternatives to the dangerous toy. Thus, toy guns that
project ping pong balls, soft gelatin pellets, or water might
be found to be reasonable alternative designs to a toy gun
that shoots hard pellets. However, if consideration is limited
to toy guns that are capable of causing injury, then no
reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be available. In
that instance, the design feature that defines which alternatives are relevant-the capacity to injure-is precisely the
feature on which the user places value and of which the
plaintiff complains. If a court were to adopt this characterization of the product, it could conclude that liability should
attach without proof of a reasonable alternative design. The
court would condemn the product design as defective and
not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of
danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible utility that no rational adult, fully
aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use or consume
the product.53

52.
53.

See 72 A.L.I. PROC. 201, 202 (1995) (remarks of Robert L. Habush, Attorney).
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. d.
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Some critics view comment d as an unholy compromise. 54
Others view it as not going far enough and demand that it be
stated as black letter law.5 5 It would not be impossible to
capture the general idea of comment d in black letter. On
balance our present thinking is that it unwise to do so. The
advantage of the comment is that it is discursive and teaches
by example. It also makes the point that, for the most part, a
court could reach the same result by a sensible application of
the reasonable alternative design requirement. If comment d
constitutes being political, we take pride in such politics. It uses
the more flexible medium of a comment to discuss a potential
theory of liability that may have limited applicability without
committing the ALI to a broader and more expansive theory of
liability.

CONCLUSION

At the outset, we said that we believe that the law of products liability can be restated. In searching for a modality to
express the rules we might have opted for a broader, more
encompassing principle of liability. Why not simply express the
liability rule in terms of general risk-utility balancing? To use
such an approach would have been both unhelpful and inaccurate. As a general principle, it would tell us little as to how
risk-utility balancing translates into a working rule in design
litigation. Risk-utility balancing has a specific meaning in the
product design context-a reasonable alternative design must
be shown to have been available. One must prove that the
danger was reasonably preventable. Furthermore, using the
risk-utility principle as a liability rule would countenance
macro risk-utility balancing, something that courts have rightly
rejected.
Drafting the Restatement has been an exhilarating experience. The ALI has established a process for developing the
Restatement that allowed for the involvement of a host of

54.
See Harvey M. Grossman, CategoricalLiability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept
Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 398-99 n.62 (1995) (arguing that such cases could be
resolved through "traditional defect analysis without resorting to categorical liability").
55.
See sources cited supra note 47.
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constituencies. We cannot, in one short commentary, chronicle
the hundreds of changes and improvements to the draft suggested by all who have written to us or presented formal
amendments at the Annual Meetings. The broadening of section
3 to include design defects and the inclusion of comment d are
two examples of changes that came about as a result of extensive discussion. Once again, if their adoption is viewed as
political we take pride in such politics.

